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KUMARAJIVA (Ch. Jiumoluoshi AIWBfr; 344-413) stands out as one ofthe most important translators in Chinese Buddhism. His translations are regarded as a milestone in Chinese Buddhist history, and have exerted 
considerable influence not only upon Chinese Buddhism, but upon all East 
Asian Buddhist traditions. Compared to the achievement of Kumarajiva's 
translations, less attention has been paid to his thought, though according to 
his biography, he was well known in the field of Madhyamaka philosophy.1 
This seems mainly due to the fact that he did not leave systematically written
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1 Kumarajiva was originally influenced by mainstream Buddhist sutras, especially the 
canon of the Sarvastivadin school. But in Kashgar he was initiated into Mahayana literature 
and firmly converted to Mahayana. He is famous for transmitting Mahayana doctrine, espe­
cially the concept of sunyata; see the Chu sanzang jiji (Collection of Notes Con­
cerning the Translation of the Tripitaka; T no. 2145, vol. 55) by Sengyou (KA (445-518) and 
the Gaoseng zhuan alii® (Biographies of Eminent Monks; T no. 2059, vol. 50) by Huijiao
(497-554). For accounts of his life, translations, and writings by modern scholars, see 
Tang 1938, pp. 187-213; Chen 1972, pp. 81-83; and Robinson 1967, pp. 71-95.
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works of his own, but only two treatises recording some fragments of his 
thought.2
2 The two works are the Zhu Weimojie jing (The Commentary on the
Vimalakirti Sutra; T no. 1775) and the Jiumoluoshi fashi dayi (The Great
Teaching of Dharma Master Kumarajiva; T no. 1856), the latter being a correspondence 
between Kumarajiva and Lushan Huiyuan W|TiH® (334-416). The former consists of dis­
cussions between Kumarajiva and his two disciples, Daosheng jUT (355-434) and Seng- 
zhao (384-414), who composed the records. The latter consists of a series of eighteen 
letters in which Huiyuan's questions take up considerably more space than Kumarajiva's 
responses, and which mainly concern basic problems of the early Mahayana.
3 See Chen 1972, pp. 81-83; Liu 1994, pp. 36-37; Robinson 1967, pp. 71-95; and Tang 
1938, pp. 187-213.
4 See Tang 1938, p. 176.
5 See Zhu 1984, ch. 13, p. 49: “The reason why I have great trouble is that I have a body. Once
I have no body, how could the trouble exist?” ziATTK-T/TW-T.
6 See Tang 1938, pp. 176-78.
There exist only a handful of studies on Kumarajiva's thought.3 The com­
mon approach in these studies is to summarize his views from the two trea­
tises and from comments left by his disciples. The studies by Tang Yongtong 
and Richard Robinson exemplify this trend. Tang sums up Kumarajiva's 
thought in four points: First, he claims that Kumarajiva held the highest 
esteem for Madhyamaka philosophy. Second, he argues that Kumarajiva's 
negative attitude toward Hinayana Buddhism is evident based on one trea­
tise that criticizes the Sarvastivada school. Third, he proposes that the impli­
cations of anatman (non-self) had not been illuminated until Kumarajiva 
correctly rendered it as wuwo (non-self) and explicated it as being 
empty of conscious spirit.4 Before that, anatman had always been translated 
as feishen (non-body), a concept that bears the imprint of Daoist phi- 
losophy5 and that exerted great influence on Chinese Buddhists. Such an 
understanding of anatman insists on the existence of the spirit, which will 
be discussed in greater detail later in this essay. Finally, Tang proposes that 
the most significant concept within Kumarajiva's philosophy is that of ulti­
mate emptiness (bijing kong ftS), which negates both being and non­
being. Tang points out that such emptiness eliminates all characteristics 
and extinguishes the way of words. Hence, according to Tang, Kumarajiva 
emphasizes the significance of the realization of wuxiang Mfi (“non­
characteristic”), which can lead to the negation of being and non-being, and 
to the realization of ultimate emptiness.6
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Whereas Tang analyzes Kumarajiva's biography and the commentary on 
the Vimalakirti Sutra, Robinson's study of Kumarajiva's thought relies mainly 
on his correspondence with Huiyuan. Robinson claims that Kumarajiva is 
an orthodox Madhyamaka thinker and enumerates several points to support 
this argument: First, Kumarajiva rejects the authority of the Abhidharma and 
interprets the Agamas in a Mahayana way. Second, he holds that the Bud­
dha's words are used as mere expedience and do not imply any real entities. 
Third, he denies that real entities arise, because (a) neither inherence nor 
non-inherence of the effect in the cause is admissible, and (b) simultaneous 
and successive occurrence of cause and effect are both untenable. Fourth, 
he maintains that reality transcends the four modes of the tetralemma, and 
he holds Nagarjuna's concept of negation.7
7 Robinson 1967, p. 90.
8 The Tibetan version was produced by Chos nid tshul khrims (Dharmatasila) between 814 
and 824. See Lamotte 1976, p. xxxvii.
9 The three extant Chinese translations are attributed to Zhi Qian (fl. 220-252), 
Kumarajiva, and Xuanzang (602-664); see note 10, below.
10 According to Lamotte, the Vimalakirtinirdesa has been translated eight times; see Lamotte 
1976, pp. xxvi-xxxvii. The translations are: (1) the Gu Weimo jing translated in
Luoyang Ml® in 188 by Yan Fotiao (n.d.), now lost; (2) the Weimojie jing
(T no. 474), translated in Jianye between 222 and 229 by Zhi Qian, still extant; (3) the 
Yi Weimojie jing translated in 291 or 296 by Zhu Shulan (n.d.), now lost;
(4) the Weimojie jing translated in Chang'an in 303 by Dharmaraksa (Ch. Zhu
Fahu ASS), now lost; an abridged version by the same translator, the Shan Weimojie jing 
is also lost; (5) the He Weimojie jing combining nos. 2, 3, and 4
synoptically (or, perhaps, using 3 and 4 as annotation for 2), translated between 290 and
Alternatively, some scholars try to examine Kumarajiva's underlying 
thought from the discrepancies between his translations and their parallel ver­
sions, since some of his translations do not accord with the Indian originals. 
It is believed that he thus may have at times made his translations in a man­
ner that inserted his own thought into the texts. In this regard, Japanese schol­
ars have done pioneering work with their studies of the Vimalakirtinirdesa. 
It is worth noting that their comparisons all rely on Tibetan8 and Chinese 
translations,9 as a Sanskrit manuscript of the sutra was not discovered until 
the 1990s.
Before examining research on Kumarajiva's thought underlying the trans­
lation of the Vimalakirtinirdesa, we need to have a look at the content and 
philosophy of this text. There is no need to elaborate on the conspicuous 
place and influence it had on Chinese Buddhism and the whole of East 
Asia. As Richard Mather claims, “the sheer number of translations10 and 
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commentaries for this sutra which appeared between the third and seventh 
centuries, and the frequency of the theme of Vimalakirti in the wall paint­
ings and sculptures of Tun-huang, Yun-kang, and Lung-men, are testimony 
to its popularity.”11 The scripture, whose name means “Teachings of the 
Bodhisattva Unstained-glory,” revolves around different dialogues between 
Vimalakirti and various groups of personages, including sravakas (disciples 
of Buddha), bodhisattvas, and tathagatas “strung together in a Rahmen- 
erzahlung with an ever-changing scenery.”11 2 Within this narrative context a 
great variety of doctrinal subjects concerning the ignorance and delusion of 
the sravakas, the superiority of Mahayana over Hinayana, the transcendental 
body of a tathagata, the ambivalence of the sexes, and so forth, are treated. 
Nevertheless, some identify a basic theme throughout the whole scripture: 
according to Erik Zurcher, the theme is the benevolent and saving power of 
the bodhisattvas,13 while Lu Cheng argues that it is refuting the Hinayana 
by impeaching their one-sided view.14 In addition, Etienne Lamotte points 
out that the Vimalakirtinirdesa, as one of the oldest Mahayana sutras, rep­
resents the Madhyamika in the raw state that served as the foundation for 
Nagarjuna's school.15 In his annotated translation of the Vimalakirtinirdesa, 
Lamotte elaborately outlines all important theses of the Madhyamika and 
how the Vimalakirtinirdesa professes them. Due to space limitations, I will 
only enumerate the theses relevant to our topic:
307 by Zhi Mindu (n.d.), and now lost; (6) the Weimojie jing translated by
*Gitamitra (Ch. Q^du^mi ®^S; n.d.), now lost; (7) the Xin Wei Mojie jing trans­
lated in Chang'an in 406 by Kumarajiva, still extant (T no. 475); and (8) the Shuo wugoucheng 
jing translated in Chang'an in 650 by Xuanzang, and still extant (T no. 476).
11 Mather 1968, pp. 60-61.
12 Zurcher 1972, p. 131.
13 Ibid.
14 Lu 1956, p. 151.
15 Lamotte 1976, p. LXII.
16 Ibid., p. LXIII.
17 Ibid., p. LXVI.
1. All dharmas are without self-nature (nihsvabhava) and are empty of 
self-nature (svabhavasunya).16
2. All dharmas are originally calm (adisanta) and naturally nirvana-ized 
(prakrtiparinirvrta). As Lamotte demonstrates: “For the Madhya- 
maka, dharmas which do not arise at all are not produced by reason 
of causes and do not enter the round of rebirth: thus they are nirvana- 
ized. For them, samsara is intermixed with nirvana.”17 As for the 
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identity between samsara and nirvana, this agrees with the most 
famous verse of the Mulamadhyamakakarika: “Between samsara 
and nirvana, there is no difference; between nirvana and samsara, 
there is no difference.”18
18 de La Vallee Poussin 1913, p. 535: na samsarasya nirvanat kimcid asti visesanam, na 
nirvanasya samsarat kimcid asti visesanam. The English is cited from Lamotte 1976, p. LXVI.
19 de La Vallee Poussin 1913, p. 374: paramarthatah sarvadharmanutpadasamataya 
paramarthatah sarvadharma-tyantajatisamataya paramarthatah samah sarvadharmah. The 
English is cited from Lamotte 1976, p. LXVIII.
20 Kawaguchi 1928, pp. 47-77. Kumarajiva had been forced to violate the discipline of 
sexual misconduct twice, first by Lu Guang (338-399) and then by Yao Xing MR 
(366-416). See Gaoseng zhuan, T no. 2059, 330a11-333a13.
3. Dharmas are without marks (alaksna) and consequently inexpress­
ible (anabhilapya) and unthinkable.
4. All dharmas are the same (sama) and without duality (advaya). 
Since dharmas are devoid of nature and empty, they are essentially 
identical, as shown in the verse from the Mulamadhyamakakarika 
that reads: “Being, from the absolute point of view, equally with­
out production and equally without birth, all dharmas are the 
same from the absolute point of view.”19
The Japanese scholar Kawaguchi Ekai analyzed the influence of 
Kumarajiva's thought upon his translation in 1928. In his Japanese transla­
tion of the Vimalakirtinirdesa with collated versions of Chinese and 
Tibetan, he surveys the discrepancies between Kumarajiva's version and 
the Tibetan translation to suggest that Kumarajiva may have intention­
ally changed the original meaning of the Vimalakirtinirdesa to transmit 
the idea of the affirmation of secular life, which Kawaguchi believes is 
used to defend Kumarajiva's sexual conduct, which severely violated 
Buddhist discipline.20 Kawaguchi's research first drew attention to the 
possible impact of Kumarajiva's thought on his translations, but unfortu­
nately his argument placed more emphasis on the religious level than on 
the academic one since he himself was a monk. The first purely academic 
attempt to identify and demonstrate the influence of Kumarajiva's thought 
on his translation of the Vimalakirtinirdesa seems to be Toda Hirofumi's 
study of 1964. This study provides us with an analysis of the places where 
Kumarajiva's translation disagrees with the Tibetan and other Chinese 
translations, and details Toda's explanations of such discrepancies with ref­
erence to the commentary recorded by Sengzhao and other related Buddhist 
texts. In so doing, Toda suggests that these discrepancies all stem from the
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translator's intentional interpolations based on his personal thought con­
cerning the affirmation of secular life, the theory of the “true nature of all 
dharmas” (Ch. Zhufa shixiang and sudden enlightenment in the
present life.21 In 1966, on the basis of Toda's research, Nakamura Hajime 
also investigated how Kumarajiva's thought is reflected in his translation of 
the Vimalakirtinirdesa. He used the same approach as that of Toda, but his 
main concern was how the translation indicates the affirmation of mundane 
life. He also argues that based on his understanding of Madhyamaka ideas, 
Kumarajiva sometimes changed the original meaning in his translation.22
21 Toda 1964.
22 Nakamura 1966.
23 A Sanskrit manuscript of the Vimalakirtinirdesa was discovered by Japanese scholars in 
1999 in Potala Palace in Tibet. It is dated to between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries; 
however, Paul Harrison further narrows down the date to around the middle of the twelfth 
century. See Harrison 2008, pp. 218-19, n. 26. The Study Group on Buddhist Sanskrit Lit­
erature of Taisho University published the trilingual version of the Sanskrit text collated with 
Chinese and Tibetan translations in 2004 and a critical edition of the Sanskrit text in 2006. 
See Study Group on Buddhist Sanskrit Literature 2004, 2006.
24 Wan 2009, p. 162.
25 Ibid., pp. 171-76.
26 Ibid., pp. 184-90.
Since the discovery and the publication of a Sanskrit version of the 
Vimalakirtinirdesa,23 the problem of the influence of Kumarajiva's thought 
on his translation has arisen once more. Wan Jinchuan proposes that some of 
our former views concerning Kumarajiva's revisions should be reconsidered. 
First, he suggests that the domestication of Kumarajiva's translation should 
not be merely attributed to the master; rather, his disciples, that is, Chinese 
exegetic monks, are also responsible for it.24 Second, the textual develop­
ment of the Vimalakirtinirdesa is probably responsible for the differences 
between the versions belonging to different periods, especially concerning 
shifts in philosophical meaning.25 Third, he argues that the replacement of 
wuxiang (non-reflection) with wuxiang (non-characteristic) to ren­
der animitta originates from Kumarajiva's period and most likely represents 
the philosophical trend that shifted the focus from the subjective level to the 
objective level.26
These studies reveal the possibility of excavating Kumarajiva's thought 
from within his translation. Their approach, which integrated philological 
and philosophical analysis, has proven to be useful. This essay intends to 
build upon this research in two respects.
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First, Kumarajiva's thought underlying the translation ought to be sys­
tematic and revolve around some Madhyamaka philosophical points that 
Kumarajiva particularly stressed. As we have stated, Kumarajiva principally 
relied on Madhyamaka philosophy in forming his philosophical viewpoints, 
and the Vimalakirtinirdesa reflects an early stage of the thought of this school. 
Thus, the viewpoints applied by Kumarajiva to the translation must depend 
on Madhyamaka philosophy even if they are developed in certain respects 
according to his personal preferences. The passages that most reflect the 
translator's thought will be analyzed in depth in the second part of this essay 
and may be classified according to three doctrinal concepts: “characteristic” 
or “distinctive feature” (xiang ft), “the equality of good and evil dharmas” 
(shane buer ASA-), and “the identity between samsara and nirvana” 
(shengsi ji niepan SOPS®).
Second, we should not neglect the fact that Kumarajiva's translations 
were made in China and assisted by Chinese Buddhists. Therefore, these 
translations are unavoidably impacted by the atmosphere of Chinese culture 
and thought. On the one hand, Kumarajiva and his team strove to adapt 
their translations to the interests of Chinese audiences; on the other hand, 
they realized the problems in previous understandings of Buddhist doc­
trines and used the new translations to correct them. As we have mentioned 
above, the concept of anatman had never been correctly understood in 
China until Kumarajiva offered the right rendering. Thus it can be assumed 
that Kumarajiva and his assistants may have changed the original meaning 
of the text in order to emphasize the correct understandings in accordance 
with his, or their, thought. It is then necessary to introduce the context of 
the period before we start our examination of the evidence reflecting the 
influence of Kumarajiva's thought.
Before Kumarajiva arrived in China and introduced new scriptures and 
thought to China, the Prajnaparamita scriptures had been widely circulated 
and studied for two centuries. There were “six schools and seven sects” of 
early Chinese interpretations of the idea of emptiness contained in these 
texts.27 The popularity and development of these scriptures was intimately 
related to the notion of xuanxue (mysterious learning), as both of these 
streams of thought place emphasis on the abolition of attachments and 
discrimination, though they have different philosophical foundations and 
terminology. Chinese Buddhist masters “partly due to the influence of the 
27 Discussions about the “six schools and seven sects” can be found in Zurcher 1972, pp. 
100-48 and Tang 1938, pp. 163-85.
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traditional Taoist education they received in childhood and partly due to the 
wish to attract their ‘compatriots' attention to their newly adopted Buddhist 
faith, frequently had recourse to Taoist terminology in their descriptions.”28 
This observation also applies to the theories of the “six schools and seven 
sects.” Thus, Zurcher argues that “all these ‘theories' are in fact different 
branches of the hsuan-hsueh [xuanxue] interpretation of the Mahayana 
doctrine of universal ‘emptiness.'”29 An analysis of these theories is unfor­
tunately outside the scope of this essay. I will here only focus on two prob­
lems pertaining to Kumarajiva's translations.
28 Liu 1994, p. 41.
29 Zurcher 1972, p. 100.
30 The English translation is that of Liu 1994, p. 55. For the original passage, see T no. 
1858, 45: 152a19-24.
First, the theories either treat emptiness equally with non-being, or regard 
it as a real, or the absolute, substance, and thereby fall either into a nihilist or 
realist interpretation. Both trends are not in accordance with the dialectical 
understanding of the Madhyamaka teaching. For instance, Kumarajiva's dis­
ciple Sengzhao, in his essay Buzhenkong lun (On Emptiness), offers
the following criticism of the theory of benwu -4<1|I.E (fundamental non-being):
As we investigate the original purports of the texts, [we shall find 
that] they simply mean by “not existent” [the state] of not being 
absolutely existent, and by “not inexistent” [the state] of not being 
absolutely inexistent. Why should [we, having interpreted] “not 
existent” as the inexistence of the existent, [go on to interpret] “not 
inexistent” as the inexistence of the inexistent? This is simply the 
talk of the lovers of inexistence.30
Adhering to the teaching of Madhyamaka philosophy, Sengzhao points out 
that things are neither existent nor inexistent, and that this should be taken 
as the true meaning of emptiness.
Second, these theories stress the existence of a permanent spiritual 
principle that derives from the incorrect understanding of the concept of 
anatman as feishen (non-body) as mentioned above. For instance, the 
“School of Stored [Impressions of] Consciousness” (Ch. Shihan zong iiiKv/0 
established by Yu Fakai py:IJrl (ca. 310-370) provides us with the following 
interpretation of this “spiritual principle”:
The Triple World is the abode of the Long Night [of birth and 
death]; conscious thought is the primary cause of the Great Dream 
[of existence]. All [impressions of] existence which we now 
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perceive are seen in that dream. But as soon as we are awoken 
from the Great Dream and the Long Night grows light, then delu­
sive consciousness becomes extinguished, and the Triple World [is 
realized as being] all empty. At that time [the mind], fully enlight­
ened, “has nothing from which it is born, and yet there is nothing 
which it does not produce.”31
31 As quoted by Jizang A1R (549-623) in the Zhongguan lunshu (Commentary
on the Middle Treatise), T no. 1824, 42: 29b3-7. The English translation is that of Zurcher 
1972, p. 142.
32 See for instance Sengrui's Pimoluojiedi jing yishu xu (Preface
to the Commentary on the Vimalakirti Sutra), included in the Chu sanzang ji: “Concept­
matching (geyi fel) is pedantic deviating from the essential. The six schools are biased and 
beyond reach” T no. 2145, 55: 59a2-3).
Yu Fakai's account of the mind indicates the understanding of atmagraha 
(clinging to self) in early Chinese Buddhism, which later yielded to the cor­
rect understanding expounded in Kumarajiva's translations.
According to the criticism of these theories made by Kumarajiva's dis­
ciples Sengzhao and Sengrui ft® (ca. fourth to fifth centuries),32 it can be 
assumed that Kumarajiva was aware of these theories and recognized the 
errors in them. Furthermore, it is likely that they had discussions about, and 
formed criticisms of, these theories during their translation activities.
The three doctrinal concepts mentioned above form the basis for analyzing 
the passages, examined below, that most reflect the influence of Kumarajiva's 
thought on his translation of the Vimalakirtinirdesa. Such an analysis will 
allow us to see how the translator inserted his own doctrinal understandings 
into the translation, how he substituted these understandings for the pos­
sible original meaning of the passages, and the extent to which the Chinese 
context impacted upon such substitutions.
EXAMINATION OF THE PASSAGES THAT MOST REFLECT
KUMARAJIVA'S THOUGHT
Characteristic/s (xiang)
In this first set of passages, I will examine Kumarajiva's use of the term 
xiang (“characteristic”), a term he uses very frequently in his translation 
to correspond both to the terms nimitta (characteristic) and samjna (idea). 
Kumarajiva also uses the term xiang to render Sanskrit words that indicate 
meanings other than “characteristic” and “idea,” as well as in places where 
the parallel texts have no corresponding term at all.
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Chapter 3.633
33 The numbers indicate the chapter and the section respectively. This subdivision fol­
lows that of Lamotte 1976. It is worth noting that the conversation between Vimalakirti and 
Maitreya beginning at 3.48 according to Lamotte is, in all three Chinese translations, located 
not in the third, but in the fourth, chapter. As both the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts accord 
with Lamotte's numbering, with the final phrase of the chapter appearing after 3.72, I use 
Lamotte's numbering throughout. The page numbers for the Sanskrit text refer to those 
found in the Study Group on Buddhist Sanskrit Literature 2006, and those for the Tibetan 
text refer to Oshika 1970.
34 Zhu Weimojie jing: (T no. 1775,
38: 346b10-11).
35 Harrison 2010, p. 240.
S: virago 'narambanagatikah (p. 21)
“[The Dharma] is without craving, being without any object.”
Tib: 'dod chags dan bral ba dmigs pa med par 'gro ba ste (p. 24)
“[The Dharma] is without craving for it has no object.”
Z: (T no. 474, 14: 521c19)
“[The Dharma] does not take desire to be unhindered.”
K: (T no. 475, 14: 540a7)
“The Dharma is free from any mode of activity, because it is with­
out object.”
X: (T no. 476, 14: 561c4-5)
“The Dharma is free from craving, because it has no object.”
According to the Sanskrit text, the object (arambana) is connected with 
craving; without it, the craving does not exist. However, Kumarajiva's trans­
lation seems to present a different implication, in which xiang is used as a 
translation of viraga (without craving). Here the term xiang could not be 
thought to indicate a “mark or sign”; rather, it means the “mode of activity” 
according to Sengzhao's commentary, which states:
The object [refers to] the object of the mind. The mode of activity 
(xiang) is what the mind reflects. Because of the object, the mode 
of activity exists. If there is no object, there is no mode of activity.34
When treating the problem of Kumarajiva's use of xiang to render samjna, 
Paul Harrison points out that “Kumarajiva is in effect focusing on the object of 
samjna, as a sign or feature we might have in our minds, in the light of which 
we recognize what we are experiencing, categorize it as this or that, and react 
accordingly.”35 Correspondingly, once there is no such sign, there will be no 
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notion of it. In this case, though there is no Sanskrit word being translated by 
the term xiang, we can still infer from the context and the commentary that 
the term is used as a rendering for samjna, by which Kumarajiva intended 
to make explicit his interpretation that the mind and its object depend on 
each other, and that, furthermore, through the realization of non-object, 
the mind will attain emptiness, which is an implication of the Madhya- 
maka theory of the “real characteristic” of all dharmas.
Chapter 3.16
S: saced evam asy avikopya satkayam ekayanam margam anugatah
(p. 24)
“[Take this food] if you can follow the path of the single way 
without disturbing the egoistic views.”
Tib: gal te 'jig tshogs la Ita ba'an mi bskyod la bgrodpa gcigpa'i 
lam du yan son (p. 26)
“[Take this food] if you can obtain the path of the single way with­
out having disturbed the egoistic views.”
Z: (T no. 474, 14: 522b4-5)
“[Take this food] if you can obtain the path of the single way with­
out knowing oneself.”
K: (T no. 475, 14: 540b24)
“[Take this food] if you can follow that which is characterized by 
oneness without destroying the self.”
X: (T no. 476, 14: 562b8)
“[Take this food] if you can enter the way of the single path with­
out destroying the view of satkaya (self).”
Here yi xiang —ft (“the characteristic of oneness”) seems to correspond 
to both ekayana (single path) and marga (way). Such a rendition made by 
Kumarajiva presents his understanding that the self is identical with the char­
acteristic of oneness,36 which means being without distinction. This agrees 
with Sengzhao's comment: “The characteristic of oneness is that all creatures 
have the same spirit, and right and wrong are taken as the same; moreover, 
the self is the same as the characteristic of oneness.”37
36 Zhu Weimojie jing: “The self is the same as the characteristic of oneness, which [you]
can follow without destroying the self” T no. 1775, 38: 350a25-
26).
37 Zhu Weimojie jing: —ffi (T no. 1775, 38:
350a26-27).
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In contrast to Kumarajiva, Xuanzang's rendering yiqu dao seems
more loyal to the Sanskrit text, of which yiqu is interpreted by Kuiji 
(632-682) to imply a view of non-self.38 It seems that Kumarajiva here 
applies his particular perspective in order to make the translation agree with 
his understanding that “the characteristic of oneness” and “non-characteristic” 
are equal and that both are essential for understanding what “real characteris­
tic” means.
38 Shuo wugouchengjing shu (Commentary on the Vimalakirtinirdesa): “The
principle of non-self is called the path of a single course (one direction)”
-jffi; T no. 1782, 38: 1046b3).
39 The comparison with “bahuvrihi” was suggested to me by Paul Harrison in a personal 
communication.
40 See Nakamura 1966, p. 370; Toda 1964, p. 429.
Chapter 3.51
S: sarvasatvanubodho hi bodhih (p. 35)
“Enlightenment is the awakening of all sentient beings.”
Tib: sems can thams cad rjes su rtogs pa ni byan chub yin pa'i 
phyir ro (p. 34)
“Enlightenment is the subsequent realization of all living beings.” 
Z: (T no. 474, 14: 524a1)
“All people will follow the path of enlightenment.”
K: -«®£W®feo (T no. 475, 14: 542b16-17) 
“All sentient beings are characterized by bodhi (enlightenment).” 
X: (T no. 476, 14: 564c26-27)
“Bodhi (enlightenment) is realized by all sentient beings.”
In this case, Kumarajiva's translation seems to omit the “bodhi” at the end 
of the Sanskrit sentence and to change “anubodha” (awakening) into “puti 
xiang” (“having the characteristic of bodhi”), the grammatical feature
of which resembles the Sanskrit “bahuvrihi,” which is used as an adjective 
to modify the noun, namely, sentient beings.39 Nakamura and Toda both 
argue that Kumarajiva intentionally changed the meaning of the original text 
to express that the awakening of sentient beings already exists in this present 
life, and thus differs from the original meaning, which possibly indicated an 
enlightenment to be realized by sentient beings in the future.40 By compar­
ing Kumarajiva's translation of this passage with that of the other transla­
tions, we can see that he has effected a change of meaning by employing the 
term “puti xiang,” indicating that the characteristic of bodhi is inherent in 
sentient beings. In addition, “puti xiang” is believed to refer to the charac­
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teristic of wuxiang (“non-characteristic”),41 which implies that awakening 
is the realization that all things are devoid of characteristics, a notion that 
agrees with Kumarajiva's Madhyamaka understanding of this issue.
41 See the Zhu Weimojie jing: “The characteristic of non-characteristic is the characteristic 
of bodhf (T no. 1775, 38: 362a22).
42 Jiumoluoshi fashi dayi:
(T no. 1856, 45: 135c26-27). The translation is that of Robinson 1967, p. 93.
43 See the Zhu Weimojie jing: “[This] also illustrates that bodhi is the real characteristic that 
removes attachments. The real characteristic is the cause of bodhi, and it is also called bodhi”
T no. 1775, 38: 362c21-22).
44 Jiumoluoshi fashi dayi:
g-S . . . (T no. 1856, 45: 140b24-c3).
In all three of the passages examined above, Kumarajiva employed the 
term xiang. In order to reveal the underlying reason for his use of this term, 
we need to consider explanations that are internal to the text as well as those 
stemming from the historical context. The internal explanations derive from 
Kumarajiva's personal thought. He substitutes, or adds, the term “xiang” in 
order to emphasize the significance of the notions of the “non-characteristic” 
as well as that of the “real-characteristic” of dharmas. Kumarajiva maintains 
that the real-characteristic of dharmas is the middle way, the ultimate truth, 
and the core of Prajnaparamita and Madhyamaka philosophy. In his corre­
spondence with Huiyuan he explains the real-characteristic of dharmas thus:
The real-mark of dharmas is conventionally termed suchness 
(tathata), dharma-nature (dharmata), and reality limit (bhutakoti). 
In this [suchness] even the not-existent-and-not-inexistent cannot 
be found, much less the existent and the inexistent.42
In addition, the real-characteristic of dharmas is also regarded as “awakening” 
(bodhi).43 It is this understanding that may lie behind Kumarajiva's choice 
of the term puti xiang.
The method of attaining the real-characteristic of dharmas, according to 
Kumarajiva, is through observing the truth of “non-characteristic,” which is 
related to that of the “single characteristic.” He writes:
Because of his keen sense organs, the bodhisattva observes the 
characteristic of the truth of suffering as that of oneness, the so- 
called “devoid of characteristic.”. . . As the bodhisattva [has] in­
depth [knowledge], he observes the four truths as one truth......
The bodhisattva penetrates into the real-characteristic of dharmas 
by means of one truth.44
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Such an explanation of “characteristic of oneness” and “non-characteristic” 
allows us to view his use of these terms as instances wherein his own 
understanding colors his translations.
The historical context of the period during which the translation was made, 
especially the state of contemporary philosophy and Buddhist exegesis, also 
explains why Kumarajiva employed the term xiang. As I have explained 
above, Kumarajiva and his assistants may have realized the problem with the 
contemporary understanding of emptiness, which deviated from the middle 
way by wrongly interpreting it as non-being and something spiritual. Thus, 
in the translation Kumarajiva and his assistants seem to use xiang to transfer 
attention from the subjective level to the objective level, from the spiritual 
to the material, in order to correct the wrong understandings of contempo­
rary Buddhist theories and to introduce Madhyamaka philosophy to their 
contemporaries.
The Equality of Good and Evil Dharmas
This second set of passages concerns the concept of “the equality of good 
and evil dharmas,” which, as mentioned earlier, is one of the central doc­
trinal points of the philosophy of the Vimalakirtinirdesa. As we shall see, 
the different versions of the passages below assume very different attitudes 
in their understanding of this concept.
Chapter 3.13
S: yadi sthaviro mahakasyapo 'stau ca mithyatvani samatikramet, 
astau ca vimoksan samapadyeta mithyasamataya ca samyak- 
tvasamatam avataret (p. 23)
“If honorable Mahakasyapa, you overcome the eight falsehoods 
and attain the eight liberations; and if, through the wrong [under­
standing of] equality, you can penetrate the right [understanding 
of] equality . . . [then you may eat].”
Tib: gal te | gnas brtan 'od srun chen po | log pa nid brgyad las 
kyan mi 'da' zin rnam par thar pa brgyad la'an snoms par 'jug 
cin logpa'i mnam pa nid kyis yan dagpa'i mnam pa nid la 'jug 
pa dan | (p. 25)
“Elder Mahakasyapa, [take this food] if you absorb yourself in 
the eight liberations without transgressing the eight perversions; 
[and also] if you [can] enter into the equality of ultimate reality 
by the equality of perversion.”
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Z: A»A§, (T no. 474, 14: 522a17-
18)
“Now venerable [Kasyapa] has crossed over the eight perversions 
and correctly experienced the eight deliverances, having gone 
beyond wrong by means of right concentration.” 
K: (T no. 475, 14:
540b6-7)
“Kasyapa, [take this food] if you are able to enter the eight eman­
cipations without renouncing the eight perversions, and enter the 
right Dharma by means of what is characterized as being wrong.” 
X: (T no.
476, 14: 562a14-15)
“Venerable Kasyapa, [take this food] if you are able to enter the 
eight emancipations without renouncing the eight perversions; [and 
if you are able to] enter the right [understanding of] equality by 
means of the wrong [understanding of] equality.”
Chapter 3.16
S: na ca te 'vidya bhavatrsna ca samudghatita na ca vidyavimukti 
utpadite | anantaryasamataya ca te samadhivimuktih (p. 24) 
“[Take this food] if your knowledge and deliverance cannot be 
produced without destroying ignorance and the thirst for existence; 
[and] if you can reach the deliverance of concentration through 
the equality of [the five acts of] immediate fruition.”
Tib: khyod kyis ma rig pa dan sridpa'i sreg pa'an ma bcom la rig 
pa dan rnam par grol pa yan ma skyed45 | mtshams med pa 'i mnam 
pa nid dan | khyod kyi rnam par grol ba yan mtshuns | (p. 26) 
“[Take this food] if you cannot produce knowledge and [a state 
of] liberation without [first] overcoming ignorance and craving 
for conditioned existence; [and] if you can penetrate the equality 
of liberation through the equality of the five inexpiable sins.” 
Z: (T no. 474,
45 Oshika 1970 reads yan skyed, but both Tibetan translations in the Peking and Narthang Kan- 
jur editions read yan ma skyed. Considering the context, I am inclined to choose yan ma skyed.
14: 522b5-6)
“[Take this food if you hold that] lacking ignorance and the 
craving for existence is not to attain the perfection of wisdom 
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(prajnaparamita); and if you have already reached the right deliv­
erance lacking the utmost transgressions.”
K: (T no. 475, 14: 540b24-
25)
“[Take this food,] if you can generate knowledge and emancipa­
tion without extinguishing delusion and desire, [and] if you can 
be delivered through what are characterized as the five transgres­
sions.”
W» (T no. 476, 14: 562b9-11)
“[Take this food,] if you can generate knowledge and emancipa­
tion without extinguishing ignorance and any craving for exis­
tence, [and] if you can enter the equality of deliverance through 
the equality of transgressions.”
In both passages, Zhi Qian's translation mainly insists upon an opposition 
between good and evil, with the latter being overwhelmed by the former. 
Asayama Yukihiko argues that such an opposition should be ascribed to 
contemporaneous Chinese thought. Asayama argues that Zhi Qian applies 
such thought to his translation and replaces the original dialectical thinking 
with it. But he bases this argument upon a comparison between the Chinese 
and Tibetan texts.46 This deserves to be reconsidered with the help of the 
Sanskrit text. Wan Jinchuan has done such research and proposes that Zhi 
Qian's translation represents the original form of the Vimalakirtinirdesa 
during that time, and reflects the opposition of good and evil present before 
the rise of the Madhyamaka dialectical doctrine.47 I agree with Wan's point, 
but a problem arises: Why do the later Sanskrit and Tibetan parallels still 
contain traces of this original doctrinal understanding, while the earlier 
translation of Kumarajiva only reflects the later one, namely, the identity 
between good and evil? A possible explanation seems to be that Kumarajiva 
intentionally changed the original text where it deals with the opposition of 
good and evil since it is not consistent with the Madhyamaka doctrine of 
the equality of dharmas. His commentary serves to reveal his attitude:
46 Asayama 1986, pp. 133-34.
47 Wan 2009, p. 173.
[Since] the nature of the eight depravities and the eight deliver­
ances is consistently equal, [if one] can be skilled in observing 
the eight depravities, he will reach the eight deliverances. Why 
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not reach deliverance without discarding depravity? If one can [do 
so] in this way, this is called reaching deliverance.48
48 Zhu Weimojie jing:
£n>#o^AW* (T no. 1775, 38: 348c24-27).
49 Zhu Weimojie jing:
(T no. 1775, 38: 350b2-5).
50 Weimojie suoshuo jing: (T no. 475, 14: 543c16-17).
51 Nakamura 1966, p. 366.
And again:
The sravakas (listeners) think that wisdom is choked by igno­
rance. Hence, wisdom [is obtained] through the extinction of 
ignorance. [They] think the mind is fettered by affection, so the 
[mind] is delivered by relieving affection. Great beings observe 
that the true characteristic of ignorance and affection is wisdom 
and deliverance [respectively]. Therefore [they] produce wisdom 
and deliverance without extinguishing ignorance and affection.49
It seems that Kumarajiva and his assistants take the opposition between 
good and evil as a Hinayana viewpoint that should be discarded. They claim 
that depravities are identical to deliverance, and that a similar relationship 
pertains between ignorance and wisdom. Hence there is no need to extin­
guish evils or ignorance in order to attain liberation. Such an attitude toward 
the non-abandonment of depravities and ignorance resembles the statement 
“generating non-characteristic without discarding conditioned dharmas”50 
from Kumarajiva's translation, which is believed, according to Nakamura, 
to be the translator's affirmation of secular life.51 The passages translated 
by Kumarajiva above all seem to incline toward his affirmation of worldly 
dharmas. Moreover, when we relate the notion, mentioned above, that “all 
sentient beings are characterized by bodhi ” to these passages, we could infer 
that Kumarajiva may have held a view of contemplation that affirms sudden 
enlightenment without the need for a gradual extinguishing of affections and 
evils. It is possible to interpret his omission of the term “sameness” from the 
passage in chapter 3:16 as being impacted by just such an understanding of 
contemplation.
On the other hand, in light of the context stated above, Chinese Buddhist 
theories had not actually mastered dialectical thinking until Kumarajiva 
introduced this new philosophy into China. Thus, it is highly likely that the 
translation here not only stems from Kumarajiva's intention to spread such 
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ideas, but is also used to eliminate the impact of old understandings not in 
accordance with Madhyamaka philosophy.
The Equality of Samsara and Nirvana
Finally, I will examine passages dealing with the concept of the equality of 
samsara and nirvana. Concerning the relationship between affliction and 
liberation, Kumarajiva's translation presents an important difference from 
Nagarjuna's interpretation of Madhyamaka doctrine as will be discussed 
below.
Chapter 3.3
S: tatha pratisamliyas ca yatha samsaravacarams ca klesan na 
prajahasi nirvanasamavasaranas ca bhavasi (p. 20)
“Not abandoning the realm of rebirth and afflictions, but entering 
nirvana, this is how to meditate.”
Tib: ji ltar 'khor ba na spyod pa'i non mons pa rnams kyan mi 
spon la | mya nan las 'das pa la yan dag par gzol bar gyur ba de 
ltar nan du yan dag gzagpar gyis sig | (p. 23)
“Not renouncing the passions which come from the realm of 
rebirth, and dedicating oneself to the complete attainment of nir­
vana, [this is how] one [sits] correctly in [meditative] repose.” 
Z: (T no. 474, 14: 521c9)
“Not generating the afflictions of samsara, in one's practice of 
meditation one is as if in nirvana.”
K: (T no. 475, 14: 539c25)
“Not doing away with the afflictions and yet entering nirvana, this 
is sitting in repose.”
X: (T no. 476, 14:
561b18-20)
“Not rejecting samsara, yet free from affliction; realizing nirvana, 
yet without any dwelling: this is sitting in repose.”
Chapter 3.58
S: sarvaklesaprasamanamanda esa yathabhutabhisambodhanataya
(p. 37)
“This is the seat of the extinction of all afflictions, because it is 
enlightened according to reality.”
FAN: KUMARAJIVA AND THE VIMALALKIRTINIRDESA 75
Tib: yan dag pa ji lta ba bzin du mnon par rdzogs par byan chub pa'i 
phyir de ni non mons pa thams cad rab tu zi ba'i snin po'o (p. 36) 
“It is the seat of the stilling of all the passions, because it is perfectly 
enlightened with regard to the true nature of things.” 
Z: (T no. 474, 14: 524b9-10)
“The extinction of all afflictions is [the place of enlightenment], 
because from this buddhas conform to the most perfect enlighten­
ment.”
K: (T no. 475, 14: 542c28-29)
“The afflictions are the place of enlightenment, because one realizes 
true reality.”
X: (T no. 476, 14: 565c3-4)
“The extinguishing of all afflictions is the subtle bodhi, because one 
truly realizes the true nature of dharmas.”
We may notice that in both cases Kumarajiva's translation assumes the 
attitude that nirvana or enlightenment can be attained without extirpating 
the afflictions, which differs from most of the versions. It seems Kumarajiva 
identifies afflictions with transmigration (samsara) and further extends this 
identification to nirvana. There is, thus, no need to obtain nirvana through 
extirpating afflictions, a notion directly attributed to Kumarajiva in his 
commentary on chapter 3:3.52 Such a perspective seems to conflict with 
Madhyamaka philosophy. The Madhyamaka position is that liberation 
should be achieved in the midst of the ordinary practices of life in the 
empirical world, but with defilements extirpated. This is strongly asserted 
by Nagarjuna in the Mulamadhyamakakarika:
52 See Zhu Weimojie jing: “Kumarajiva says: ‘Affliction is identical with nirvana, therefore 
the former does not need to be eliminated before entering into [nirvana]'” (ftHofiffiWSM.
T no. 1775, 38: 345b5-6).
53 de La Vallee Poussin 1913, pp. 349-50: Karmaklesaksayan moksa karmaklesa vikalpatah, 
te prapancat prapancas tu sunyatayam nirudhyate. The English translation is cited from Ng 
Yukwan 1993, p. 164.
There is moksa (liberation) from the destruction of karmic defile­
ments, which are but conceptualizations. These arise from mere 
prapanca (conceptual play), which is in turn banished in sunyata.53
Based on Kumarajiva's preference for mundane life, we may infer that he 
deliberately eliminated the boundary between the afflictions and nirvana, and 
76 THE EASTERN BUDDHIST 47, 1
identified a samsara in which the afflictions are not extirpated with nirvana. 
Furthermore, this extension of Madhyamaka doctrine that identifies samsara 
and nirvana seems relevant to his understanding of practice mentioned above. 
The notion of liberation with the non-extirpation of afflictions implies imme­
diate enlightenment. In this sense, the afflictions can also be identified with 
enlightenment.
Aside from these points, the translation probably involves Kumarajiva's 
consideration of the Chinese philosophical context. Before he introduced the 
new interpretations through his translations, Chinese Buddhists' understand­
ing of nirvana did not include Madhyamaka philosophy. In earlier Chinese 
Buddhist translations, nirvana is always translated as wuwei (non­
conditioned) and miedu MS (extinction-deliverance). Both terms for nir­
vana, according to Sengzhao's explanation, respectively take into account 
the nature of nirvana as transcending the conditioned realm, and indicate 
the extinction of the body and deliverance from the four streams of desire, 
illusion, existence, and ignorance.54 This understanding of nirvana can be 
regarded as the dominant trend in Chinese Buddhist exegesis between the 
second and fourth centuries. To exemplify the point, I cite two passages 
from essays by famous laymen active during this period. The first is from 
Feng fayao (Essentials of Religion), written by Xi Chao (336­
54 Sengzhao, Niepan wuming lun 
4#SIo&SKtao«S#o«M*®*«oSSB« (T no. 1858, 45: 157b29-c3).
55 Fengfa yao, included in the Hongming ji (Collection of Essays on Buddhism),
T no. 2102, 52: 89a3-5. The English translation is that of Zurcher (1972, p. 174).
377), in which nirvana is described as follows:
If one is neither afraid of activity, nor attached to the contemplation 
of Emptiness; and, if all principles are effaced, and one does not 
hold to, or rely upon, anything, then one does not plant any [seeds] 
at all. Since one does not plant, one is not subject to retribution. 
The vast emptiness of the mystic discarding [of all notions]—that 
is the nirvana of the Buddha.55
The other quotation is from the emperor of the Later Qin (387-417), 
Yao Xing BM (366-416), who wrote a letter to his brother Yao Song BS 
(n.d.-416) concerning the meaning of nirvana. It is this letter, excerpted 
below, that stimulated the composition of Sengzhao's Niepan wuming lun 
(Nirvana is Nameless):
FAN: KUMARAJIVA AND THE VIMALALKIRTINIRDESA 77
Sentient beings transmigrate perpetually in samsara all because of 
attachments and desires. Should the desires in their hearts cease, 
they would no longer be [bound up] with samsara. Being no [longer 
bound up with] samsara, their spirits would be absorbed in the pro­
found silence, and their attainments would be equal to the [infinite] 
void. This [state] is called nirvana. As it is called nirvana, how 
could it permit the presence of names?56
56 This letter is included in the Guang hongming ji (Further Collection of Essays
on Buddhism), compiled by Daoxuan (596-667), T no. 2103, 52: 229c29-230a3. The 
English translation is that of Liu 1994, p. 68. Concerning the Niepan wuming lun, see note 
54.
Such interpretations of nirvana are basically in accordance with earlier Bud­
dhist thought, for which nirvana merely means deliverance from samsara. 
However, in light of Madhyamaka theory, samsara and nirvana in essence 
are identical. We may infer from the treatises of his disciple Sengzhao and 
his royal patron Yao Xing that Kumarajiva would have been familiar with 
contemporary Chinese interpretations of nirvana and their shortcomings. 
Thus, based on his own views and the desire to correct what he perceived as 
a mistaken understanding of the relationship between samsara and nirvana, 
Kumarajiva introduced new translations that advocated the identity of the 
afflictions and liberation.
CONCLUSION
This study takes as its point of departure the complicated problem of trying 
to determine the extent to which Kumarajiva's thought influenced his trans­
lation of the Vimalakirtinirdesa. It follows a philological approach like that 
applied by previous research, which identified certain discrepancies between 
Kumarajiva's translation and other versions of the Vimalakirtinirdesa as 
deriving from Kumarajiva's personal understanding of Buddhist doctrine. 
This essay has examined three doctrinal concepts—the real-characteristic 
of dharmas, the equality of good and evil, and the identity of samsara and 
nirvana—in order to tease out where and why Kumarajiva made the deci­
sions he did when making his translation. It argues that he imprinted his own 
understanding upon these concepts based on his personal preferences for lay 
Buddhist practice and for an understanding of meditation that emphasizes 
the possibility of immediate enlightenment. A striking example of this is his 
affirmation of the possibility of attaining liberation without having to extir­
pate the afflictions.
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An examination of the historical context of the period in which Kumarajiva 
worked reveals a disjuncture between conventional Buddhist understandings 
of doctrine and the new interpretations introduced by Kumarajiva. As Wha­
len Lai has suggested, “Chinese Buddhists truly embarked on a ‘Mahayanist' 
phase after the introduction of key Mahayana sutras and key treatises of 
Nagarjuna by Kumarajiva.”57 It can be argued that one of the motivating fac­
tors for undertaking his translation was to correct what he perceived as prob­
lematic interpretations of Buddhist teachings. Thus, Kumarajiva's translation 
of the Vimalakirtinirdesa reflects a dialectical interaction between his own 
thinking and that of the Chinese philosophical context in which he worked. 
Both of these factors come together to serve his ultimate aim, namely, to 
transmit Madhyamaka philosophy into China.
57 Lai 1978, p. 339.
Last but not least, it is worth noting the contribution that Kumarajiva's 
Chinese assistants made to the translation. Sengzhao's commentary on the 
Vimalakirtinirdesa, which records discussions made by contributors during 
the translation process, reveals the extent of their participation and influence. 
The treatises left by Kumarajiva's disciples also present important details 
of the contemporaneous philosophical context in which the translation was 
made. Moreover, these Chinese assistants were responsible for polishing and 
styling the text during the translation project. Therefore, we cannot exclude 
their possible contributions to the choices made for employing particular 
terms and expressions in the translation. Finally, due to a lack of textual 
sources, especially that of an earlier Sanskrit manuscript, there remain other 
possible explanations for the discrepancies between the extant translations 
besides that of the influence of Kumarajiva's own thought. This study is, 
thus, a work in progress, and looks forward to future studies that may elab­
orate upon its findings.
ABBREVIATIONS
K Kumarajiva's translation of the Vimalakirtinirdesa, the Weimojie suoshuo jing
(T no. 475, 14: 537a-557b).
S Sanskrit text from Vimalakirtinirdesa: A Sanskrit Edition Based upon the
Manuscript Newly Found at the Potala Palace. Ed. Study Group on Buddhist 
Sanskrit Literature, The Institute for Comprehensive Studies of Buddhism, 
Taisho University. Tokyo: Taisho University Press, 2006.
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T Taisho shinshu daizokyo 85 vols. Ed. Takakusu Junjiro affi
JiH'ft® and Watanabe Kaigyoku Tokyo: Taisho IssaikyO Kankokai,
1924-32.
Tib Tibetan translation of the Vimalakirtinirdesa cited from Tibetan Text of
Vimalakirtinirdesa. Ed. Jisshu Oshika. Chiba: Naritasan Shinshoji, 1970.
X Xuanzang's translation of the Vimalakirtinirdesa, the Shuo wugoucheng jing
(T no. 476, 14: 557c4-588a24).
Z Zhi Qian's translation of the Vimalakirtinirdesa, the Foshuo Weimojie jing
^®S^® (T no. 474, 14: 519a4-536c24).
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